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Waiting for the Energy Crisis: Europe and the United 
States on the Eve of the first Oil Shock 
Nuno Luis Madureira ∗ 
Abstract: »Warten auf die Energiekrise. Europa und die USA am Vorabend des 
ersten Ölschocks«. A global economic crisis is the most difficult kind of event 
to predict. This article asks a straightforward question: did anyone come close 
to anticipating the oil crisis of 1973/74, which represented a new type of his-
torical sequence? Was the likelihood of an oil shock self-evident at the time? 
To answer this, I examine the degree of awareness in Europe and the United 
States of the three possible triggering factors: Egypt’s disposition to start a war 
and enlist the support of oil-producers; the Arab interest in oil conservation 
and long-term income maximization; and the imbalance in the oil market and 
the delayed adjustment of oil prices. For each of these topics, I set out both 
what was expected and what was actually in the offing; the information avail-
able to Western analysts and that unknown; the communication noises and the 
flagrant bias. The conclusion pays tribute to three men – James Akins, Pierre 
Wack, and Ted Newland – who had guessed what was coming ahead, and ex-
plains why their predictions almost succeeded, while others failed. 
Keywords: Oil crisis, forecasting, oil price, natural resources economics, infor-
mation asymmetry. 
1.  Introduction 
The 1973 Middle East crisis was a major global event. Everybody was caught 
by surprise when the Egyptian-Syrian/Israeli conflict erupted throughout the 
Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights and when six Gulf oil ministers announced 
their intention to deploy oil as a weapon at a critical moment in the combat. In 
the ensuing months, distant consumers felt the consequences of this decision, 
with queues at gas stations, rising retail prices worldwide, and overall inflation 
that soared into the double digits in most European countries. Spiraling out 
from a regional conflict into commodity markets and, thereupon, into the world 
economy, the string of incidents has been acknowledged by contemporaries as 
a new type of historical sequence.1 Henceforth, the “oil shock” concept has 
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stuck as shorthand for unpredictable geo-political twists, with wide ranging 
impacts on the energy supply curve. 
The disturbances spread out in ever-widening circles that rippled through 
the global economy. In the short run, the sequence of events covered widely by 
the media provided the basis for a narrative of the oil crisis that was built on a 
self-explanatory causal sequence: Arab unity, in defense of Arab people and 
Arab land, led to the deployment of the oil weapon and the price hike. Subse-
quently, academic research has unraveled new facts and new explanations that 
went largely unmentioned in the standard “story.” And since the October 1973 
crisis brought together different realms of action that were subsumed under a 
new categorization, its overall interpretation has become dependent on which 
part of the story has been deemed to play the determinant role. Three distinct 
views have come to the fore and gathered strength: the first stresses political-
military factors, the second economic conditions, and the third the political 
economy of resource conservation. 
According to the political-military literature, the defense of Egyptian and 
Saudi Arabian interests, as embodied in the interests of their rulers, Anwar al-
Sadat and King Faisal bin Al Saud respectively, was the real driving force 
behind the 1973 military and economic convulsions. These actors, not the Arab 
nations, triggered the chain of events that resulted in the oil shock. As the Israe-
li historian Avraham Sela points out, “the Arab war coalition of 1973 under-
lined the emergence of a core triangle of Arab power, comprising Egypt, Syria, 
and Saudi Arabia.”2 On the other hand, the enlistment of Saudi Arabia as 
among the active supporters of the Arab coalition meant that the oil embargo 
was perceived as part of the overall war strategy right from the outset.3 
The second view, situated chiefly within economic thinking, holds that mar-
ket pressures, rather than political or military events, were the real drivers 
behind the petroleum price increases. Significantly, this view surfaced shortly 
after the events to allay concerns about additional measures undertaken by the 
Middle East cartel. In direct response to President Carter’s dramatization of the 
crisis, Congressman David Stockman declared that “the October 1973 and the 
subsequent price boost were almost entirely economic events; that they are 
generated by nearly irresistible global economic forces.”4 Neo-classical econ-
omists such as Robert Mabro subscribed this thesis later, stressing the predom-
inance of the market environment over political wills:  
When the market is tight, as in 1973, in 1979-80, and in August-October 1990, 
prices are set by the market and not by the fiat of core producers. Hence a par-
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adox: despite appearances to the contrary, the price rises of 1973, 1979-80 and 
1990 were fundamentally market phenomena.5  
More recently, Robert B. Barsky and Lutz Kilian resumed this argument, point-
ing out how the unique institutional features of the Middle Eastern market 
delayed the oil price adjustments following the 1970s’ boom in demand. So the 
actual prices remained low, even while the global demand for oil and other 
industrial commodities expanded to unprecedented levels. “With the abandon-
ment of these contractual agreements in late 1973, the real price of oil jumped, 
but much of that increase represented a correction of the market disequilibrium 
rather than a response to the geopolitical events.”6 Moreover, the observed 
price increases for oil over the 1973-1974 period were not substantially differ-
ent from those of other industrial commodities for which political considera-
tions can be ruled out, therefore casting doubt on the importance of the oil 
embargo itself.7 
The third interpretation holds that price increases resulted from the transfer 
of property rights from international oil companies to national governments 
that began perceiving reserves as an exhaustible asset worth conserving in 
order to maximize their long-term income. In the Middle East, the appropria-
tion of natural resources took the form of a halt in the granting of new conces-
sions, moving later towards equal participation in the existing explorations, 
which endowed governments with a share of the oil produced, before, lastly, 
full nationalization (as in the cases of Algeria, Iraq, and Libya). These changes 
empowered governments with the ownership and management of depletable 
resources, “turning the belief in scarcity into reality” 8 and opening the door to 
oil conservation, lower production, and lower levels of investment. The previ-
ous competition between oil producers to steadily increase production and ex-
tract more income from the taxes paid by multinational companies was replaced 
by incentives to restrain production, preserve finite resources, and augment petro-
leum prices. In the aftermath of the Egyptian-Israeli war, Arab governments 
seized the opportunity to impose monopoly power through cooperation-in-action 
and enact production cutbacks. Under this perspective, the oil weapon reflected 
the new stance of Arab states towards natural resources,9 neatly abridged by the 
motto “the best bank is a hole in the ground.”10 
To a large extent, the disagreements between the aforementioned accounts 
reflect different ways of considering causation and explanation. While the 
political-military view that Egyptian and Saudi Arabian interests were the 
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driving forces behind the first oil shock appears grounded in meaning, and 
intention of actions and processes, the market-led explanation bears down on 
the concept of a necessary and efficient cause, pinpointing which mechanisms 
or factors prove more likely to bring about a certain outcome (i.e., a price in-
crease). The former view captures the meaning of action for those involved in a 
perceived set of circumstances approaching market disequilibrium, interpreted 
as a favorable background for political usage. The latter focuses on the expla-
nation of outcomes, rather than processes, and counterfactually posits that, 
without the unique conjecture of excess demand and the disappearance of spare 
capacity, all endeavors to use the oil weapon would have been doomed to fail 
(as had happened with the Arab oil embargo of 1967). In this vein, Sadat’s 
decisions and those of the Arab oil ministers in October 1973 were neither 
sufficient nor necessary to bring about the price hike. The true cause must lay 
elsewhere. It therefore becomes erroneous to consider market disequilibrium as 
a background condition – to most economists, market disequilibrium represents 
the objective cause that prompted the first oil shock. 
Finally, the thesis of the transfer of property rights from international oil 
companies to national governments points towards a cause, or a set of causes, 
that happens at a particular moment in time, but with enduring effects. Consid-
ered a critical-juncture cause,11 the property rights change unleashed a break-
through in the management of natural resources, as evident in the new ap-
proach towards oil as a weapon: while previous Arab measures against the 
West-Israeli alliance had resorted to the pattern of oil embargos, a new possi-
bility burst onto the scene in 1973 with the immediate cutback in oil production 
by Arab states, subsequently compounded by further cutbacks per calendar 
month. Such a policy implied that the leading countries did not mind losing 
their relative market share due to restrictions on production, because in doing 
so, they were conserving the oil in the ground. In hindsight, the cuts proved 
much more effective than the embargo, enhancing the role of the Arab states 
and OPEC members as price setters in a tight international market. From this 
perspective, the first oil shock constituted a turning point in the political econ-
omy of petroleum, as it transformed not only the rules of the game but also the 
attitudes of the players. 
Alongside these academic interpretations there were also public accusations 
that US oil companies and/or the US government had, in fact, attempted to 
uphold the increase in oil prices, even if they did not recognize this intention 
publicly.12 The public release of extensive original historical sources from the 
Nixon era by the State Department in 2011 nonetheless provided few clues for 
the “conspiracy” thesis. An alternative interpretation, which is much more in 
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er, 14 January 2001, 7; Robinson 1989, 117-9; Vietor 1984. 
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tune with published historical records, has been suggested by the former Secre-
tary General of OPEC, Francisco Parra. According to Parra, the long-term 
economic policy oversight was not so much ingrained in the White House, but 
rather in the US State Department, whose executives came to agree that higher 
taxes on oil and higher consumer prices could be beneficial for the United 
States’ long-term interests. The core argument was that higher oil prices would 
encourage exploration, domestic production, and the development of alterna-
tive energy sources, gradually reducing the dependence on imported oil. Histor-
ically, the benign position towards oil-producer claims become noticed during 
the negotiations of Western oil companies with Libya in 1970 and 1971. With 
the escalation of demands, the State Department recognized that it could no 
longer control the pace of events in the Middle East, and in the run-up to Octo-
ber 1973 and the Yom Kippur War, most of its endeavors were concentrated on 
restraining OPEC from excessive price increases.13 
Having summarized the main theses about the origins of the first oil shock, 
let us now turn our attention to the perception of these issues prior to the Octo-
ber 1973 shock. The ensuing pages examine the degree of awareness in Europe 
and in the United States of the three possible triggering factors: Egypt’s dispo-
sition to start a war and enlist the support of oil producers, the Arab interest in 
oil reserve conservation and long-term income maximization, and the imbal-
ance in the oil market and the delayed adjustment of oil prices. For each of 
these topics, I lay out both what was expected and what was actually in prepa-
ration, the information available to Western analysts and that unknown, the 
communication noises and the flagrant bias. Underlying this research agenda is 
the concept of asymmetrical knowledge between regional actors and global 
decision makers, which rendered the ongoing transformations very difficult to 
grasp. Secrecy, deception, private management, and closed networks amplified 
the opacity of information. This analysis draws on a collection of authoritative 
sources, including experts, government officials, and corporate business de-
partments from the Western countries that held footholds in the Middle East oil 
business (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy), which were 
thereby well positioned to have access to first-hand information and prospec-
tive studies. Within this scope, most forecasts proved wide of the mark.  
2.  The Rosy Perspective 
Confidence in the stability of the Middle Eastern oil markets flickered in the 
early 1970s. Estimates for future investments, prepared by expert committees 
from state departments and public corporations, reaffirm that oil prices “will 
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move in line with OECD inflation,” reaching, in some scenarios, a real increase 
of 1.5 percent per year or, in the worst conceivable circumstances, 5 percent 
per year.14 Accordingly, for 1985, one could reasonably expect crude prices 
within the $3 to $4.5 per barrel range (bbl in 1971 prices), even if everybody 
accepted that predictions were tending to become much more uncertain around 
that time and with a greater propensity towards higher annual increases.15 In 
reality, the average OPEC price after the first and the second oil shock was 
$25.7 per barrel (or about $10 in 1971 prices), more than double that envi-
sioned. Under this keenly optimistic outlook, oil was also expected to remain 
the primary fuel for energy systems, beating coal in competitiveness through-
out the next decade.  
Market conditions were changing quickly, however. Though Western ex-
perts were wary of the shifts introduced by the new international system forged 
during the Tehran and Tripoli settlements (1971), in which oil prices became 
subject to negotiations between major oil companies and national governments, 
some of them believed that the balance of power could be redressed. More to 
the point, Europeans and Americans believed that the dynamic cutting edge, 
which was headed by Mediterranean oil producing states politically labelled as 
“radical” (i.e., Algeria and Libya, as well as Iraq, which exported some of its 
crude output through the Syrian oil pipeline to the eastern Mediterranean 
coast), had its days numbered. The compliance with higher posted prices, high-
er tax rates, and new operational rules for concessions and exploration would 
prove to be the end of the line. Under these international arrangements, there 
would be stability within at least five years. These beliefs were furthermore 
reinforced by theoretical arguments repeated time and again. On the one hand, 
“OPEC was a failed cartel whose actions were bound to be ineffectual under 
the circumstances” since a number of factors would “restrain OPEC members 
from pushing claims for increased prices to extremes.”16 On the other hand, the 
“tax yield of oil producing nations will tend to diminish (at least marginally for 
the extraction of crude) from the moment at which significant opportunities 
might be seized by the nuclear industry.”17 Finally, as “exporting countries, or 
their national companies,” become the sellers on the world markets “competi-
                                                             
14  Draft paper for Ministers on energy policy, 17 September 1971, Ministry of Power, National 
Archives U.K. (NAUK), POWE-14-2500. 
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16  “The Oil Companies and the OPEC Demands, Memorandum of Conversation”, 2 December 2, 
1971, in Qaimmaqami and Keefer 2011, 223-8.  
17  Groupe prospective de la Commission d’Énergie, L’offre de Pétrole, Premier Ministre – Com-
missariat Général du Plan, Archive Nationale de France (ANF), boîte 19910737-1. 
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tion will break out again and prices will decline.”18 If Pandora’s Box of Arab 
claims had been opened, it could still be closed for good. 
Inasmuch as the events unfolding in 1971, 1972, and 1973 run counter to 
this view, the defensive stance of Western energy spokesmen gradually became 
a form of wishful thinking. As matters turned out, the tranquilizing outlook of 
Western business interests in oil, electricity generation, and transportation con-
veyed the assurance that all these convulsions would turn out fine. Indeed, the 
abovementioned quotations draw on hallmark ideas advocated by the most influ-
ential energy “gurus” of the time: the academic economist Morris Adelman and 
the US government adviser and oil consultant Paul Frankel, whose authoritative 
hints echoed throughout the business community. The bottom line of their mes-
sage was the prediction of a long-term decline in the price of oil – a view re-
stated in Adelman’s famous book The World Petroleum Market, published at 
the crossroad of 1972.19 Key developments, such as market disequilibrium, 
growing demand caused by low oil prices, and the chance that Arab producing 
countries might pursue their own best interests in the meantime, went unmen-
tioned. Not by accident, some experts in governmental energy agencies criti-
cized the basic lack of understanding underlying this conjecture, dubbing these 
presumptions the “rosy view” of the future.20 To them, the error lies in buttress-
ing competition in Europe and the United States, when the key market driver 
had become the producing countries oil policy.21  
Still, even the rosiest scenarios had to consider the possible outbreak of war. 
Memories of the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict were still fresh, and it was taken for 
granted that any resumption would likely trigger another oil embargo. This was 
all the more so the case when participants of the Khartoum conference, which 
was held in the aftermath of the Arab defeat in August of 1967, deliberated a 
plan to put pressure on Israel by denying oil to Western Europe and the United 
States. In the ensuing years, this shadow hovered over Western governments, 
leading to a consideration of the risks of dependence on the Middle East. Over-
all, the prospects for energy security seemed less rosy and riskier than the sce-
narios regarding long-term prices. 
One of the politicians most concerned over the issue of energy security was 
conservative UK Prime Minister Edward Heath, who requested a broad-
reaching assessment of the scope for displacing oil consumption in the United 
                                                             
18  Adelman 1973, 261.  
19  Adelman 1973, 260-1. 
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Kingdom shortly after taking office. The assessment was assigned to the Work-
ing Party on the Security of Oil Supplies, whose conclusions disavowed any 
permanent displacement in the usages of oil in industry (specifically, cement 
and steel) and electricity generation, but favored the further expansion of man-
datory stocks. By this means, Britain could improve its strategic security with-
out blurring the economic competitiveness ensured by cheap fuels. Permanent 
displacement, or inter-fuel substitution, would result in only an awkward med-
dling by the conservative government in the commercial orientations of public 
enterprises, ushering in the wasteful application of economic resources:  
a new coal station might cost about £3-4 a year for every ton of oil displaced, 
a new nuclear station started now [at] about £2-3. This is about the same as 
the annual cost of oil storage in tanks (about £3 a ton) but more than the annu-
al cost of oil cavity storage or coal stocks (about £1 a ton).22  
Increasing reserve stocks might finally introduce a deterrent to Arab threats 
because “the consuming countries should use their own main advantage, which 
is that most OPEC countries need their revenue. This means holding oil stocks 
big enough to cause OPEC countries serious financial losses.”23 
But exactly what amount should be stocked? How much was needed to suc-
cessfully overcome an oil embargo? Ideally, it was said stocks should guaran-
tee as much as one year of consumption. A more realistic assumption was to 
count on a six month embargo. Nevertheless, given the operational costs, the 
feasible alternative appeared to be a three month strategic reserve, in line with 
the OECD’s target recommendations. As matters turned out, the Working Party 
soon discovered that even this downsized program was difficult to implement 
due to resistance from the oil companies over its execution, at least at their own 
expense.24  
The same problem loomed at this time in France. With mounting consump-
tion and “the probability of a major crisis occurring between 1975 and 1990,” 
the Board of the Plan recommended an increase in reserve stocks from the 
current level of 35 days to the plateau of 60 days and resorting to underground 
storage. Using cost-benefit reasoning, they also concluded that this policy 
would increase the costs of the oil stored by 0.80 F/ton.25 Germany went to 
even greater lengths, aiming to approach a 90-day reserve plateau. The United 
States set its target at around 45-50 days, and Japan set its at around 45 days, 
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while some countries, such as Italy, showed reluctance toward any increase 
beyond 45 days.26 Irrespective of the country, the final figures were gross esti-
mates with variable reliability and with the constant updating of demand. The 
extraordinary increase in consumption around the dawn of the 1970s in particu-
lar had an erosive effect upon stocks, due to the continuous expansion in stor-
age capacity required just to keep pace with existing security levels. The over-
all policy review stemmed in part from this new conjecture. 
Potential instability in the Middle East, OPEC, the swelling dependence up-
on Arab oil, the disappearance of surplus capacity in the United States, and the 
ever-increasing share of petroleum in the energy balance arrived to haunt 
Western capitals. However, in spite of worrisome signals, there was no threat 
in sight, no enemy to fear, and no impeding deadline. While concern mounted 
in some circles within the US Department of State, in Japan, and in Germany, 
politicians and businessmen elsewhere continued to view the situation through 
the lens of the past. In so doing, they posited that all the uncertainty was transi-
tory and, furthermore, manageable – transitory because OPEC had exhausted 
its bargaining power, and market competition could restore the trend toward 
lower oil prices; manageable because precautionary measures could defend 
developed nations and strike a blow at “Arab blackmailing sheiks.”27 Such was 
the core message of the “rosy view” associated with the wishful thinking of 
business and with the governmental view that upgraded reserve stocks had 
deterrent power. Even while the world was changing at breakneck speed, for 
some the crux of the matter was still just the likelihood of an oil embargo. 
What was lacking was any awareness of how Arab nations or OPEC member 
states might otherwise pursue their own best interests and wield market power 
to reap the full benefits of the market imbalance. 
In the meantime, while some of these ideas were under discussion, planning 
for war was getting underway. Under Egypt’s leadership, the crucial preparato-
ry steps for war took place between April and October 1972, avoiding Western 
attention and Israeli intelligence. The deception fostered a split between surface 
events and veiled facts. The fuzzy perception of Middle East disturbances by 
Western analysts continued to map four probable triggers for an eventual oil 
crisis: the resurgence of Arab-Israel conflict, a Palestinian uprising, a Libyan 
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embargo, and the escalation of Iran-Iraq skirmishes.28 The course of events, 
however, was already being driven by an overlooked actor: Egypt.  
3.  War, Secrecy, and the Oil Weapon 
One of the consequences of the first oil shock was the rise of a wave of interest 
in the Arabs, mainly visible in the “sheik-mania” spotlighted by popular press. 
Before that, the Palestinian issue and the first outburst of terrorism received the 
most attention. The ensuing pages show why the preparation for the Egyptian-
Israeli war was completely overlooked in the West, by both governments and 
non-governmental institutions. Ultimately, there was no way to keep pace with 
what was going on because concealment was the foremost condition for 
launching the offensive.  
After Nasser’s glaring defeat in the 1967 War, the vision of an all-
embracing pan-Arabic nation that bound together people from the Mediterrane-
an to the Persian Gulf was robbed of its impact and content. The quest for a 
continued struggle against Israel remained deeply rooted in Arab feelings, but 
the wounds of defeat discredited the former objectives. Commitment to the 
unified Arab cause was henceforward replaced by patriotism, local nationalism, 
the resurgence of Islam, and anti-Western pronouncements.  
As several authors have noted, this move away from the revolutionary pan-
Arab regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser prompted a breakthrough in Middle East-
ern geopolitics. Nasser’s death in September 1970 opened the way for the 
appointment of his vice president, Anwar el-Sadat, to the presidency. What 
appeared to be a political transition of continuity, even if from a strong charis-
matic leader to a weaker one, soon evolved into a far-reaching overturn of 
Egypt’s pan-Arab “socialist” foundation. As of 1971, Sadat gave signs of a 
more liberal approach and opened up the economy to foreign trade and invest-
ment, promoting the return of private assets sequestrated by the state to their 
former private owners and, with the arrest of left-wing Nasserist followers, 
setting off a crosswise purge of the government and central institutions. One 
year later, Soviet advisers were expelled from Egypt, after a strident press 
campaign punctuated by scandals. By this point, it had already become clear 
that Sadat had consolidated his power.  
Vested with renewed authority following the suppression of domestic dis-
sent, the Egyptian president had to cope with the Israeli question and the legacy 
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of continued occupation of the large areas of Arab territory taken in the Six-
Day War in June 1967, including the West Bank, Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, 
and the Sinai Peninsula down to the Suez Canal. Beyond the continued political 
pressure on university campuses, in the media, and at demonstrations for re-
trieving the land that Israel had captured, Egypt faced the economic conse-
quences of defeat, as evident in the closure of the Suez Canal and the deadlock 
over transit fees charged to ships, the loss of Sinai’s oil fields, and the drop in 
tourism revenues. The curtailment of foreign currency inflows worsened the 
internal situation, characterized by very slow growth in agriculture and indus-
try, the long-term decline in new investments, and mounting budgetary con-
straints.29 By all accounts, the standoff “neither war nor peace” was untenable 
and constricted the very future of Egypt.  
Although Sadat strove to avoid a reckless entry into war, it soon became 
clear that diplomatic routes would lead to dead ends. Impaired by Israel’s in-
flexibility, the more urgent international priorities of the United States, and the 
precautionary and skeptical Soviet outlook towards the Jewish-Arab conflict, 
Egyptian diplomacy found little room to maneuver. What ensued was a double-
track policy grounded in the pursuit of an international peace settlement but 
also in the threat of war. Over time, the awareness that Egypt could not negoti-
ate with the Israelis until it demonstrated that it could fight militarily became 
broadly and deeply rooted within some sectors of the army,30 pushing Sadat 
into preparation for the offensive. This maturing process took place between 
April and October 1972. At this point, the diplomatic wavering was reshuffled 
to serve the purpose of strategic deception.  
Not surprisingly, the theme of military deception and secrecy has been 
among the most thoroughly studied in recent decades, a fact to which is not 
strange, since there was the need to understand just why Israeli intelligence 
“failed” and the Egyptians were able to cross the Suez Canal on October 6, 
1973. Despite some divergences between Egyptian and Israeli sources regard-
ing the role played by deception at the stages of conceptualization and plan-
ning, and regarding its effectiveness, there is common agreement that the 
Egyptian strategy and tactics succeeded quite well.31 Coupled with the deploy-
ment of new antitank weapons, this was a key factor that affected the prompt-
ness of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).  
Among the actions that, deliberately or unintentionally, concealed the offen-
sive plan and, most importantly, the decision to attack,32 the following are 
considered the most relevant: international endeavors and national pledges 
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restating Egypt’s continuing commitment to a political solution; shifting goals 
that resulted in successive deadlines for the Arab attack, spreading the “cry 
wolf” syndrome among the enemy; the spreading of rumors of inadequate 
maintenance and a lack of spare parts for Egyptian military equipment, with 
leaks to the foreign press; the probable usage of wireless networks for decep-
tion purposes; planting of a cover story inside Egypt stating that the vast mili-
tary preparations and activities were but part of a large-scale all-arms exercise, 
named Tahrir (Liberation) 41; serene policy declarations by Egyptian leaders 
on the eve of the attack; choreographed groups of Egyptian soldiers leisurely 
fishing along the Suez Canal just before the outbreak of war; and deploying 
smoke screens to camouflage the bridging operations and the forces engaged in 
crossing the canal.33  
All artifices were designed to load the dice against Israel. Surprise and de-
ception played such an important part in the Egyptian planning mostly because 
they had highlighted vulnerability in the “impregnable shield of steel” of the 
Israel Security Doctrine, which had been studied intensively since the 1967 
defeat.34 The vulnerability consisted of the dependence of military defense on 
early warning – if the Israelis were to have learned in advance the Egyptian 
decision to start an offensive and its timing, this would have allowed the mobi-
lization of the IDF reserve formations in time, deploying them to reinforce the 
“Bar-Lev Line” fortifications. Thanks to the strategic surprise effect, the key 
principle of the Israel Security Doctrine – rapid transference of the war into 
enemy territory – could be torn down. 
Along with deception, Sadat further envisaged a new Arab objective aimed 
at political rather than military victory over Israel, which he called the “strategy 
of phases.”35 The concept behind the capture of enemy territory by “stages” 
pointed not to an all-out offensive across the Sinai Peninsula, but to limited 
territorial objectives located closer to the eastern bank and jump-off bases, 
inflicting heavy losses of life and arms on the enemy in the time intervening, so 
as to establish optimal conditions for political negotiations. Then, in the ensu-
ing stage, diplomacy and international intermediation could terminate what had 
been initiated by force of arms, seizing still greater territorial gains for Egypt. It 
is important to note that both “deception” and the “strategy of phases” stemmed 
from acknowledgement of Israel’s military superiority in technology, arma-
ment, and maneuverability. By implementing a three-stage operation – a cross-
ing, an immediate shift to the defense, and banking on international political 
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pressures – Egypt avoided advancing its ground forces too deeply into the Sinai 
Peninsula, minimizing its relative feebleness in the domain of air combat and 
long-range missiles. On the other hand, for these limited territorial objectives, 
the SAM batteries supplied by the Soviet Union could be deployed close to the 
troops and thus provide the necessary air cover.36  
 As expected, the outbreak of war arrayed all Arab states against Israel, con-
veying the notion that the Arab-Jewish clash had once again resumed. Yet, as 
stressed by most scholars, this was not just another edition in the long-running 
Middle East conflict. With this new strategy of phases, secrecy, and deception, 
Sadat did not attempt to destroy Israel, involve the Soviet Union, and mobilize 
a wider Middle Eastern military colligation. Instead, he attempted to destroy 
the Israeli defense concept, demonstrate Egypt’s independence from Soviet 
centers of decision making, and appeal to Syria and Jordan for a concerted 
attack across the Golan Heights, while concealing his intentions from most 
Arab leaders. This pattern of single-state initiative, single-state goals, and sin-
gle-state alliances distinguished the nationalist drive from previous pan-Arab 
intents in the war against Israel. For instance, Yom Kippur’s strategy entailed 
the likely acceptance of coexistence with the Jewish state in its pre-1967 bor-
ders and the relinquishment of the Palestinian issue. 
The expression “oil weapon” became meaningful as never before. Under the 
new strategy, there was no distinction between military and political means, 
and no distinction between regional and global factors. Everything that could 
be used to turn the tide in favor of the Arabs should be deployed at the proper 
stage of the conflict and take advantage of the surprise effect. Sadat already 
sensed that the oil weapon trump card might ease the passage from the military 
to the diplomatic stage. And his message to the troops was crystal clear in this 
respect: “With the exacerbation of the energy crisis – and the currency crisis –, 
Arab pressure exerted in propitious circumstances could be a factor to be reck-
oned with.”37  
The Egyptian determination to pool economic and military weapons on the 
battlefield is therefore clear, even when taking into account that Sadat was not 
absolutely sure about Saudi Arabia’s willingness to comply with its promises 
(Sadat’s suspicions proved partially true, since King Faisal’s ultimate engage-
ment was conditional upon a US decision to support Israel). From the Arab 
perspective, the economic situation held a reciprocal effect upon the political-
military options.  
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4.  Production Cuts and Oil Conservation 
When the Egyptian and Syrian troops attacked Israeli forces across the Sinai 
and the Golan Heights on October 6, 1973, the uproar in the Arab world imme-
diately followed suit. Kuwait, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and Iraq 
were among the most vocal in calling for bold, resolute, and unyielding action. 
The reaction of Saudi Arabia was nonetheless different: the Wahhabi monarchy 
had financially backed the Egyptian war effort and had been informed of the 
exact timing of the attack. By distancing themselves from the diehards, the 
Saudis drew the red line on the lopsided American engagement in the ongoing 
war. Any misstep made by the United States, such as resupplying the Israeli 
armed forces, would only meet a reply of unforeseen consequences. The begin-
ning of the American airlift to Israel on October 13 removed any remaining 
doubts. Thus, the Conference of Arab Oil Ministers, held in Kuwait on 16-17 
October, approved an immediate oil price increase (the first ever unilaterally 
set by production countries), a cut in production levels, and the imposition of 
an oil embargo on “enemy” nations until all Israeli forces had fully completed 
their withdrawal from the occupied territories. 
It is still difficult to trace the exact origin of the “production cuts” proposal, 
which constituted the major political innovation from the Kuwait Conference. 
We do however know that the plans for implementing this idea were well de-
fined beforehand by the Saudi Oil Minister Yamani,38 that its design was dis-
cussed by the Gulf governments and also prior to the Kuwait Conference it-
self,39 and that the proposal was submitted as an initiative backed by Saudi 
Arabia and the Egyptian government.40 According to Pierre Terzian, the con-
cept of downsizing oil extraction was grounded in a study commissioned by the 
Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum from the engineer Mahmoud Ruchdi and was 
designed to identify the best ways in which to deploy oil as a political weapon. 
After its completion in 1973, the study was submitted to Yamani, and it framed 
subsequent Arab decisions.41  
For all intents and purposes, production cuts represented additional pressure 
upon developed nations, tightening up the oil market still further, and enhanc-
ing the marginal scarcity of world demand. On top of that, the other weapon, 
the selective oil embargo, did not bear the expected fruits, as it proved to be 
easily circumvented by reshuffling suppliers to non-Arab countries or by re-
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shuffling cargoes at high sea, off the Arab radar. All eyes therefore turned to 
the gross cut in 5 million barrels/day of supply to the market, which became the 
landmark of Arab power. After 17 October 1973, the oil price skyrocketed 
quickly and loosely, with every company scrambling to secure supplies.  
The singular possibility of forsaking production increases proved central to 
this breakthrough. In the petroleum community, this represented a change 
equaled only by the production controls set in the 1930s by the As-Is cartel and 
by the Texas Railroad Commission. However, those were times of glut and 
excess oil supply. Now, thanks to the prospects of the appropriation of under-
ground resources and to excess demand, a stream of opinion surfaced in the 
Arab world opposing any increases in production. 
Imbued sometimes with an anti-Western discourse, the conservationist view 
considered the former policy a “waste of the national asset” and a blank check 
handed to the United States and its pro-Israel policies.42 On other occasions, 
wrapped in language “unheard outside journals of ecology,” oil conservation 
became a fashionable piece of rhetoric put forward by senior ranking Arab 
executives to justify further price increases, particularly Iranian representa-
tives.43 In this context, it becomes difficult to single out what was a real policy 
shift and what was occasional speech making. Ideas and interests need to be 
ascertained by historical practices. On present information, it would seem cau-
tious to suggest that oil conservation entered the political agenda of Arab coun-
tries when the appropriation of those natural resources coincided with startling 
technical problems within the framework of resource management. In other 
words, ownership associated with depletion awareness prompted the shift to-
wards conservation. Three cases do fall within this qualified profile, which is 
distinct from the rhetorical call for conservation: 
Libya 
Libya was the first Middle Eastern state to pursue a policy of forthright produc-
tion cutbacks. The change happened after the coup that brought the revolution-
ary Muammar Qaddafi and his Free Officers movement to power in 1969. 
From the outset, the new regime embarked on a complete overhaul of the oil 
policy, beginning with the commissioning of a geological engineering study of 
Libyan reserves. Carried out by a prestigious team of Venezuelan experts, the 
final report recommended slowing down the rates of production to spare the oil 
fields from quickly losing gas pressure and the consequent troubles in oil flow-
ing up to the casing head. From May 1970 onwards, a special Ministerial 
Committee ordered a series of reduction cutbacks by different companies, 
which curtailed Libyan production from the peak of 3.7 million barrels per day 
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(MBD) attained in April 1970 to 2.9 MBD five months later. Although the 
American government and American companies regarded all such changes as 
tactics that put pressure on foreign enterprises to demand higher taxes and 
higher prices, it was also recognized that “the Libyans may be partially moti-
vated by the desire for more detailed oil field data. It has been a longstanding 
Libyan goal to get such data from the companies…so that authorities can accu-
rately judge whether in fact a field is being produced too fast or not.”44 A 
search for information, alongside basic uncertainties regarding reserves estima-
tion, appeared, thereby, to be a key driver in Libyan oil policy. 
Kuwait 
Quite significantly, the changeover in Kuwait’s oil policy commenced in a demo-
cratic manner through a parliamentary debate that was subsequently magnified by 
the press, trade unions, political parties, and public opinion. On February 1972, 
two deputies blamed the foreign interests present in the Kuwait Oil Company of 
misreporting the assessment of oil reserves by releasing the figure of 66 billion 
barrels (66 x 109) when the real stock was 24 billion.45 The alarm that followed 
sent shock waves throughout the country, as it threatened its main source of 
income. The government was thereby forced to order an independent assessment 
from a US firm, set a monetary reserve fund for future generations, and enact a 
conservation law that froze production at 2 million barrels per day (MBD). 
Saudi Arabia 
The huge increase in Saudi Arabia’s production from 3.2 MBD in January 
1970 to 8.3 MBD in September 1973 brought in its wake unexpected technical 
problems. To manage the country’s giant and super-giant oilfields, the national 
oil company, Aramco, began injecting water at early production stages, instead 
of the then-usual practice of resorting to secondary recovery technologies only 
when a field had entered its declining phases. Through this procedure, engi-
neers sought not only to maintain reservoir pressures and their capacities to 
push oil to the surface, but also to displace oil from the outer edges of the fields 
toward the central regions, in order to eliminate the formation of a gas cap and 
thereby keep up high well flow rates. With production skyrocketing, Aramco’s 
plans for water injection nonetheless fell behind schedule (with problems in 
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drilling wells, operational delays provoked by sand and corrosion, shortages in 
the supply of salt water, and failures in pumping equipment), which resulted in 
an unexpected drop in reservoir pressure.46 By March 1973, rapidly falling 
reservoir pressures and earlier-than-planned encroachment of saltwater were 
already curtailing plans for raising capacity, and the Saudi government issued 
Aramco with a number of warnings to either cut back production or replace it 
with installed capacity from heavy crude oilfields. By September, just before 
war broke out, Aramco had already reduced its forecasts for forthcoming oil 
availability.47 
All these signs were overlooked in Europe and the United States, albeit with 
the remarkable exceptions pinpointed in the next section. The Libyan revolu-
tion was a traumatic occurrence for the oil companies that had tapped into the 
emotive language of breach-of-contract concessions. Kuwait’s turnabout was 
pigeonholed as a case of uncertainty in estimating reserves. Saudi Arabia’s 
troubles went completely unnoticed, save for some Aramco engineers, and only 
after the oil shock was the issue spotlighted in US Senate hearings. Altogether, 
the discovery of the magnitude of these problems was ex post facto. Not only 
did Western analysts and politicians disregard conservation and the nationalist 
appropriation of natural resources as driving forces in the Middle East, but, 
most of all, they also missed the fact that this was an opportune occasion to 
start a war against Israel and restrict production, “inasmuch as key Arab pro-
ducing nations, had already planned cuts.”48 On the contrary, the repeated 
argument emphasized the belief that oil exporters would not risk cutting back 
on volumes, because they could not jeopardize long-term income. The scope 
for cutting back on volumes but still increasing total income, within a price 
setter’s deployment of a market power framework, was surprisingly sidelined. 
Ingrained into the cornucopian age, Western decision makers remained 
aloof to conservation practices, as they perceived no utility in conservation by 
design or in conservation imposed by circumstances. Leaving natural resources 
in the ground appeared unsound whether by choice or by condition. The link 
between the net resource price, the push conveyed to production, and the pace 
of exhaustion had somehow fallen into oblivion. This causal relationship had 
been cast in a seminal work published in 1931 by the economist Harold Ho-
telling, but drew little attention at the time. Now, under the tremor of the first 
oil shock and other civilizational forewarnings,49 Hotelling’s theory was quick-
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ly rediscovered and put to good use. Owing to the rediscovery, the rational 
behavior of natural resource owners could be grasped and understood:  
If the net price were to rise too slowly, production would be pushed nearer in 
time and the resource would be exhausted quickly, precisely because no one 
would wish to hold resources in the ground and earn less than the going rate of 
return. If the net price were to rise too fast, resource deposits would be an ex-
cellent way to hold wealth, and owners would delay production while they en-
joyed supernormal capital gains.50 
After the fateful year of 1973, the rational explanation for leaving exhaustible 
mineral resources in the ground came into its own. Conservation was more 
likely to happen after a long period in which the price of the resource rose 
below the current rate of return, bolstering a race to the bottom in production. 
Seen from this perspective, 1973 was the year of a radical change in the rela-
tionship between the value of the resource and the rate of return. Once neglect-
ed, the economic theory of exhaustible resources sprang forth with full force. In 
reality, the economic theory of exhaustible resources was an offspring of the 
first oil shock. 
5.  Market Imbalance and Arab Interests 
Little was known about the events unfolding in the Middle East. Secrecy veiled 
political and military developments, and the scarcity of information, coupled 
with biased outlooks, obscured the changes in oilfield management. This means 
that two out of the three likely causes for the increase in crude prices remained 
off the Western radar, leaving a single factor for which there was plentiful 
information: market imbalance. But could a singular assessment of market 
conditions in 1973 suggest that some fundamental discontinuity was in the 
offing? As pointed out in futures’ literature51 about “disruptive events,” “structur-
al breaks,” “discontinuous bursts,” “wild cards,” and “surprises,” the forecasting 
of “low-possibility futures,” or “not-impossible eventualities” involves the capac-
ity to think the unthinkable (examples range from 9/11 to the fall of the Berlin 
Wall).52 Thus, the theoretical hint is that any attempts to surmise events like the 
oil shock would have to reach beyond observable market conditions. 
It is certainly not by accident that the men who came closest to guessing 
what was coming were employed in mapping developments in the global oil 
market. More tellingly still, they arrived at similar conclusions far apart from 
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each other and drawing upon different methodologies. James Akins, in his role 
as Director of Fuels and Energy at the US State Department, had first-hand 
information on the Middle East. He resorted to a historical overview of recent 
events to infer that a price increase, if not a turbulent energy crisis, was likely 
to occur. Meanwhile, Pierre Wack and Ted Newland, planners in the London 
office of the newly formed Group Planning Department of Royal Dutch Shell, 
resorted to the construction of multiple scenarios in the oil business to depict a 
synthesis of possible paths of events. Later, through a design process based on 
intuition and inductive reasoning, Wack and his team narrowed the initial cata-
logue into a new class of scenarios, grounded on the occurrence of an inevita-
ble disruption. A “predetermined” factor that cut across all possible futures had 
been discovered. Irrespective of what might actually happen, oil prices would 
rise rapidly and leave the whole business environment badly shaken. In brief, 
“the unthinkable was going to happen.”53 In May 1973, Shell’s Group Planning 
began focusing on the single scenario of a sharp oil price increase. 
Each of these methodologies blended observation with the induction of un-
observable trends. Long acquainted with the backstage of Middle Eastern gov-
ernments, and a fluent Arabic speaker, James Akins made use of his “inside” 
information crossed with historical analysis to formulate hypotheses about the 
most likely Arab economic decisions. Considering the opportunity costs for 
selling oil in international markets beset by mounting inflation and dollar de-
valuation, the approach of a saturation point in the absorption of income from 
exports, the looming stream of conservationist viewpoints within the Arab 
ruling class, and the political strains caused by American-Israeli assistance, the 
obvious conclusion favored an impending rupture with the past as increasing 
oil production no longer served Arab interests.54 By the same token, Shell’s 
Planning Group designed an assortment of graphs characterizing driving forces 
in Arab policy (1970-1985). For each country, a graph represented the forecasts 
of the producing government’s oil take, the capacity to absorb income from oil 
exports, the pace of reserve depletion, and the incentives for high production 
levels. As Wack’s team weighted more heavily than Akins the long-term factor 
of exhausting conventional oil, along with the income absorption capacity,55 
their bottom line likewise emphasized a halt in the age of abundance and the 
correspondingly expected curtailment of oil supplies.56  
Separate bits of information were integrated into a holistic image of the fu-
ture, which exposed stable causal factors and driving force mechanisms that 
linked actions to outcomes. Once every piece found its place, the conclusions 
could hardly be different: the assemblage of what was known (tight interna-
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tional markets with excess demand, no spare capacity, inelasticity of supply in 
the short and medium term) with that hypothetically conjectured (national 
interests in restraining production, Arab self-interest in mutual cooperation) 
and what was uncertain (political turmoil, war) could only produce full-blown 
turbulence. It was precisely the capacity to integrate the separate features of 
economics, international relations, and business that enhanced the foresight of 
these predictions. The small role ascribed to political events indicates that both 
Akins and Wack believed the oil crisis was going to occur irrespective of the 
evolution of the Israel-Arab conflict. 
The reverse conclusion is also true. The lack of integration was one of the 
main reasons attributed to the consecutive failures in the CIA’s prospective 
analysis during the Yom Kippur War. According to the US Senate Commission 
appointed to assess the secret services performance, the bulleted worldview of 
the organization was based on “analytic components organized around offices, 
each of which treated a separate discipline, with only limited substantive inter-
action among them.”57 Dealing moreover with scattered and incomplete pieces 
of information under conditions of internal tensions and cleavages led the 
agency to miss the signs of the preparation for war, the shift in Saudi attitudes, 
and the impact of oil price increases on the international economy. 
From the foregoing observations, we should not conclude that everything 
ran smoothly in keeping with the Akins and Wack outlook. To begin with, they 
had no clear-cut idea about when the crisis was supposed to start or about the 
magnitude of the shock resulting. Shell’s Planning Group admitted that the 
events might begin unfurling perhaps from 1975 onwards, as this was the term 
of the Tehran-Tripoli international agreements. Price projections, on the other 
hand, were relatively optimistic in both forecasts, with the authors positing 
Arabian Gulf crude oil prices doubling to $5 per barrel by 1975 and rising to $7 
or $8 by 1985. Hence, the most unexpected development and the one that no 
one came close to guessing was the magnitude of the change, specifically the 
sudden fourfold increase in crude prices, which corresponded with an unimagi-
nable deviation from the regular course of events – more than thirty-seven 
moving standard deviations (“thirty seven sigmas”)58 relative to the historical 
norm of price changes. Such an unimaginable outcome was, by all accounts, 
the real shock.  
To a large extent, the underestimation of the intensity of the resulting turbu-
lence explains why the recessionary and inflationary impacts of the oil price 
increase went unnoticed in both Shell’s scenarios and in James Akins’ outlook. 
Another relevant misperception was the skepticism of OPEC member state 
capacities to spend increased oil revenues rapidly and without spawning large 
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macro-economic instability.59 Globally, what appeared to contemporaries as an 
alarmist perspective proved in reality to be a conservative estimate of the po-
tential disruption. The “unthinkable” was broader than foreseen. 
Although Wack’s report was able to change Shell’s management mindset 
and prepare the organization for the troubling times ahead, he also realized that 
the warnings were ignored outside the oil company. Akins, in turn, encountered 
little support from within the State Department and even less from within the 
White House, particularly when Henry Kissinger became the ascending star of 
Foreign Policy. Despite that, Akins was able to inscribe the measures of the ur-
gent policy shift into Nixon’s “Special Message to the Congress on Energy Poli-
cy,” which was delivered around the same time as the well-known article pub-
lished in the April 1973 issue of Foreign Affairs. Most efforts were to no avail, 
however. Decades of progress, economic catch-up, and affluence imbued a sense 
of ease in a world that, paradoxically, seemed utterly chaotic and difficult to 
understand. In the end, Akins, Wack, and Ted Newland stood out like characters 
of a famous theatrical play: together but alone, waiting for the energy crisis.  
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